

2 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER  
Plans and Programs  
Office of Civil Defense  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Updated Papers on  
Soviet Civil Defense

STATINTL

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum to CIA/OCR [REDACTED]  
8 June 1962, OCD Control No. 62-5-437/2 re  
Request for Updating Papers

1. Pursuant to the referenced request, there are attached two revised papers on the subject of Soviet civil defense: Soviet Civil Defense, U; and Changing Civil Defense in the USSR, Secret/No Foreign Dissem.

2. The unclassified paper Soviet Civil Defense, should not be generally released for publication, nor should it be attributed to CIA. It may be used freely, however, within the US civil defense structure for briefing or answering questions on Soviet civil defense.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CENTRAL REFERENCE

STATINTL

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Liaison Staff

Enclosures: (2)

1. Soviet Civil Defense, U. 56.3806A - EP 62-72-51
2. Changing Civil Defense in the USSR, 56.3806 - EP 62-72  
18 September 1962, Secret/No Foreign Dissem.

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**CHANGING CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE USSR**

(Project 56,706)


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Changing Civil Defense in the USSR

1. Summary of Recent Changes

The continued development of larger nuclear weapons and their means of delivery has apparently forced the USSR to reevaluate and revise its civil defense program. Soviet civil defense is certainly in a process of change, although many aspects of the emerging new system are not entirely clear.

Changes thus far discernible in Soviet civil defense include: (a) probable subordination of civil defense to the Ministry of Defense; (b) retitling the system as Civil Defense (GO) from the older term Local Anti-Air Defense (MPVO); (c) a staff reorganization; (d) public endorsement of civil defense by leading military figures; (e) change from a point -- or city -- defense concept to one of area defense; (f) increased civil defense publicity and insistence on universal public training; (g) development of strategic urban evacuation as a civil defense tactic; and (h) preparation of mobile civil defense units. A changed shelter concept also has been indicated, with increased emphasis placed on the use of adaptable shelter space in existing structures and self-built, earth covered trenches or dugouts.

2. Characteristics of Soviet Civil Defense

Since World War II the official view of the USSR has been that civil defense is a necessary measure. Soviet strategists have emphasized the importance of "rear area" defense for several years. During any major war, civil defense literature stresses the probability of nuclear attack directed against centers of population and industry.

There is some evidence of a high-level disagreement over the value of civil defense in the period from about 1958 to 1962. However, this controversy was apparently settled in favor of continued, if not increased, civil defense effort in May 1962, when Deputy Minister of Defense, Marshal V. I. Chuykov, speaking "on behalf of the Soviet Armed Forces and R. Ya. Malinovsky, Minister of Defense," stated, "Civil defense now must be considered as one of the basic elements in over-all preparation of the country for defense."

The following factors tend to facilitate the preparation and operation of civil defense in the USSR: (a) regimentation of the people should help maintain discipline in an emergency; (b) central control of civil defense assures planned development; (c) there is a legal compulsion to

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serve in civil defense; (d) the characteristics of most new urban housing -- usually large masonry apartments -- have permitted the preparation of basement shelter areas with a good level of radiation attenuation and have reduced fire hazards; (e) although the USSR did not use civil defense extensively in World War II, some practical operational experience was acquired; and (f) in the event that chemical and biological agents become more accepted means of warfare, the USSR has the advantage of some preliminary preparations -- for example, the Soviet civil defense trainee has already been given instruction in defense against biological and chemical agents, including nerve gases.

Soviet civil defense operates under security restrictions. A great deal of information, at the level of what the individual citizen needs to know, is disseminated through pamphlets, a specialized periodical press, in training courses, and just recently, through radio and television broadcasts. However, civil defense plans, the level of civil defense supply, the amount of shelter prepared, and the status of civil defense organizations higher than the basic citizen "self-defense" group are not published.

The Soviets have been reticent in publicizing the effects of nuclear weapons, possibly intending to avoid alarming the population. Articles published in 1961 and 1962, however, gave limited treatment for the first time to the effects of 10 and 50 megaton weapons, and introduced the concept of widespread fall-out contamination. Publication of this information generally coincided with the publication of manuals and films on protection from the "radioactive cloud."

The public is given detailed behavior instructions and has been assured that proper civil defense preparations will substantially reduce casualties even under conditions of nuclear warfare. Popular level civil defense training is aimed at the entire adult population and is being made increasingly compulsory. However, the Soviet civil defense planner is concerned not only with the preservation of manpower, but with the protection and recovery of the government control structure, transport, communications, and industry, all of which are important to the continued functioning of the state.

It is clear that the USSR uses a priority system in civil defense, classifying cities and installations (such as factories, transport and communications installations) according to their civil or military importance. Such classification undoubtedly determines the type and degree of civil defense preparations developed.

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## 2. Organization

The organization of Soviet civil defense involves the use of a corps of specialized staff officers for planning and direction; the maximum use of existing governmental and economic facilities, organizations, and services for implementation; and the use of mass social organizations for the general training of the population in first aid and civil defense.

Civil defense officers function at all levels of government. The central body responsible for civil defense preparations is the Staff of Civil Defense of the Country, which probably is now subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The Chief of Civil Defense for the USSR is reported to be Marshal V. I. Chaykov, a First Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander of the Soviet Army Ground Forces. His most logical assistant, or Chief of Staff for Civil Defense would be Colonel General O. V. Tolstikov, who was formerly a Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs for Local Antiair Defense (MPVO) -- i.e. civil defense.

Subordinate to the national headquarters are staffs at republic, oblast, and city levels. Officers serving with all these staffs are specially trained for civil defense, probably at a school in Leningrad.

At the local level, the Soviet civil defense organization relies heavily on existing organizations to furnish the leadership and nuclei of operative civil defense services. Such organizations include police and fire departments, medical installations, and communal repair services. These groups are organized into civil defense services and operating units that include those for fire defense, emergency engineering, medical aid, maintenance of order and security, warning and communications, transportation, food and trade, blackout and power supply, veterinary services, and decontamination. Auxiliary personnel may be recruited to bring these units to the desired strength.

It must be noted that the head of a Soviet governmental or economic unit also is the nominal chief for civil defense. For example, the chairman of the city executive committee or the factory manager also is a civil defense commander. His Civil Defense Chief of Staff, however, is the official supervising material preparations and training.

The civil defense organization of principal economic enterprises is similar to that of cities, with services for maintaining order, fire fighting, and medical aid, which use as nuclei the factory guard, fire department, medical staff, and the like. Workers serve as auxiliary personnel.

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In residential buildings, small factories, collective farms, and schools and institutions, "self-defense groups" are formed from among the residents, workers, or students. Within such groups (containing as many as several hundred persons), civil defense teams are formed with functions similar to those of the city services, and approximately 50 persons are assigned to operative civil defense roles.

### 3. Changes in Organization

The organizational structure described above is little changed from that which was used during World War II -- particularly at the city level. In addition to minor alterations in organization, however, there is evidence that supplementary civil defense units exist or are being planned, and that schemes for alert and post-attack operations have been altered.

In February 1962, one civil defense official stated, "If, under earlier conditions, our cities, using their own resources, could solve the problems of protecting the population and economic installations from enemy air attacks and of dealing with the damage caused by bombardment, contemporary conditions will require the use of greater forces and resources... That is why local anti-air defense has ceased to be local and has become a state-wide system..."

#### a. Staff

Formerly the various headquarters for Soviet civil defense higher than the city level were titled "offices" and "administrations" with a "main administration" at the national level. Since 1956 these offices have been referred to as staffs. Inasmuch as the city level headquarters (the operative level in emergencies) was designated as a staff before 1956, it is logical to assume that oblast and republic civil defense headquarters now have operative tasks instead of being only administrative headquarters. This change would be consistent with planning assumptions that take into account heavily damaged cities needing outside assistance.

As noted above, the civil defense staff structure probably is now subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The civil defense staff was formerly under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which was abolished at the national level early in 1960.

#### b. Civil Defense Troops

There is reason to believe that the USSR has developed military or paramilitary civil defense units trained for disaster relief.

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Troops of MPVO -- i.e. troops of civil defense -- were mentioned in a Soviet newspaper in 1957, when a conference of their outstanding servicemen took place in Moscow. Civil defense troops, usually called "battalions," have been known to exist in several European Satellite nations since about 1954. The majority of such units are reported to be of the reserve type.

There has been no identification of troops of "civil defense" since the Soviet MPVO system was renamed civil defense in 1961.

#### c. New Units and Tactics

Two of the operative services of the city civil defense system were added during 1958 -- the Transport Service and the service entitled Food and Trade.

In connection with the appearance of the Transport Service, it should be noted that the first clear postwar reference to limited evacuation of the Soviet urban population was included in civil defense publications in 1958. For example, the Transport Service is specifically charged with the evacuation of school children and other nonworkers.

"Evacuation commissions" were first mentioned in a civil defense manual of 1960. During urban evacuation, representatives of such commissions are to be located at assembly points, in buildings, and at militia stations.

Soviet publications have indicated that operative civil defense units, under the city services, will be dispersed in an emergency. At least part of a city's reconnaissance, fire-fighting, engineer, and medical units will leave the city (warning time permitting) to operate after an attack from the peripheral areas of the city.

#### d. Auxiliary Rural Units

Additional aid for the post-attack relief of urban areas is apparently to be developed through mutual aid and by the formation of additional operative groups in rural areas. A publication of 1960 stated that "citizen's units in rural areas may be called on to help in cities that have suffered a nuclear blast...." The publication specifically called for reconnaissance units that "must" be established in settlements near large "industrial and administrative settlements"; technical units with functions of rescue, repair, and road clearance; and decontamination units.

In January 1962, Col. Gen. Tolstikov stated, "Nonmilitarized [civil defence] formations ... are being created in collective farms,

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state farms, and other rural economic enterprises." In June, alert instructions were published which called for such units to be maintained in a state of "constant readiness" in a period of threatened attack announced by the proper authority.

e. Participation by the General Public

Recent Soviet civil defense literature stresses that all adult citizens should be trained not only in "self defense" but in repair, rescue, and restoration work. Citizens may be assigned to work with regularly organized civil defense units. It thus appears that in the final analysis every able-bodied citizen is to become a potential working participant in the Soviet civil defense forces.

4. Training

The Soviet authorities have entrusted civil defense training of the general population to the paramilitary society known as DOSAAF -- Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy.

Before the institution of universal civil defense training for the Soviet population in 1955, training was rudimentary and included no information on atomic weapons. Its goal (in 1948) was reported to be the training of 4-5 million persons per year. There was a sharp increase in civil defense training in 1955, and training since then, at the popular level, has included instruction in protection against atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.

a. Courses

To attain the goals set during 1955-60, 60 million people per year would have had to take training courses in the USSR. The first course at the popular level started in 1955 and was entitled Anti-Atomic Defense (PAZ) -- a 10-hour course. This training program was to have been completed in 1956, but it was not until February 1958 that the USSR claimed that 85 percent of the population had completed the course. This figure probably was inflated, especially as it applied to rural areas. A course entitled Anti-Air Defense (PVO), which was to have been given to the general public in 1957-58, added instruction in defense against biological and chemical attack and was a 22-hour program. No figures have been announced concerning the extent of participation. A third course, "Ready for Anti-Air Defense, First Grade," begun in 1959, was a 14-hour program and emphasized testing and practical work. Although early pledges apparently indicated that the course was to be completed by the beginning of 1960, the training continued through 1960. Lt. Gen. Varennikov, Chief of Civil Defense Training for DOSAAF, reported in January 1961 that most

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DOSAAF units had coped "satisfactorily" with the task of training the public in the third course.

At the same time, Varennikov stated that DOSAAF units were turning to the task of giving training in a fourth course entitled "Ready for Anti-Air Defense, Second Grade". This course, which is designed to train citizens to assist the operative "special" civil defense units, requires performance of a number of practical exercises (such as decontamination, fire fighting, rescue, first aid, and transportation of casualties). Older people -- men over 60 and women over 55 -- are not required to do the practical exercises that include digging in debris, removing dummies from windows of upper floors, carrying simulated casualties, and other strenuous activities. Since early this year, Soviet paramilitary publications have published authoritative statements calling for the completion of the fourth civil defense course by the end of 1962.

b. Self-Defense Groups

In a few instances, civil defense journals have described the training activities of specific self-defense groups, which could be part of popular level training or which could represent supplementary drills.

c. Operative Groups

Drills by operative civil defense units above the "self-defense" level are not extensively reported, probably because the activity of such units is obscured by security precautions. Some publicity has been given to the training of organizations for search and rescue, and reports have been received telling of unit exercises -- most of which have taken place in factories.

d. Schools

Compulsory courses in civil defense are given in the USSR in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education.

e. City Drills

Since 1957, civil defense drills have been reported held in more than 20 Soviet cities. In general, these drills appear to have been limited to blackout and staff exercises. US observers witnessed such a drill in Tashkent in June 1962.

f. Other Instruction

A variety of courses are being given for civil defense workers and instructors in a network of Soviet civil defense schools and training

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centers. Most recently, DOSAAF was given the additional task of preparing and giving instruction to leaders of the non-military civil defense formations (mentioned above) as well as to certain specialists including dosimeter operators, radiomen, vehicle drivers, and bulldozer operators. It was acknowledged, in early 1962, that this mission will require "enormous" organizational work and the training of instructor personnel for DOSAAF civil defense schools.

#### 5. Construction

Formal shelter construction in the USSR since World War II has included preparation of special basements under masonry buildings, construction of detached underground shelters, the improvement of subways for emergency shelter use, and probably the construction of some tunnel-type shelters. Designs of ventilating intakes for air raid shelters include blast traps and antidust filters for protection against atomic explosion and radioactive dust.

##### a. Basement Shelters

The USSR has been constructing air raid shelter basements or basements adaptable for shelter purposes under large masonry buildings for more than 10 years. Until 1954 (although gas tight) these were mostly of light construction. Ceilings of shelters (first floors of buildings) were reported generally to be concrete, 5 to 8 inches thick. Although the construction of this type of shelter is still reported, some heavier basements with ceilings a foot or more in thickness have been seen since 1955.

Two Western travelers were told in 1959 and 1960 that construction of basement shelters under apartment houses had been halted in four large Soviet cities. In one instance a construction worker added that better shelters were being built "elsewhere." Soviet citizens and officials have also denied that the USSR was building shelters during the past three years. However, reports are still received of heavy basement construction and basement shelter building under new buildings and it is believed highly doubtful that basement shelter construction has been entirely stopped.

##### b. Special Shelters

Designs for detached air raid shelter bunkers and tunnels were printed in 1956 Soviet civil defense manuals. (Before then, civil defense literature presented only schematics of basement shelters and field-type, wood-lined trenches covered with earth.) Increasing numbers

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of reports (from about a dozen cities) have been received of underground shelters in the USSR during the past 4 years. When their function is mentioned, detached shelters and tunnels are said to be for communications installations or government headquarters, or they are located in major industrial plants. Some have been seen in urban park areas and at railroad installations. This special protection for government, communications and important industry is consistent with a priority system providing better protection for installations of special state importance.

c. Subways

Soviet civil defense publications and other reporting leave no doubt that subways in the USSR are prepared for use as air raid shelters. The installation of new blast doors in the Moscow subway probably was started about 1955. The Moscow subway is still being expanded, and the first section of a subway in Kiev was opened in 1960. In this section, blast doors have been reported by reliable observers. Another Soviet subway is located in Leningrad, and one has been started in Tbilisi. Unpublicized tunnel construction in Baku is for a subway that has not been completed.

d. Communication Hardening

There is good evidence of the hardening of communications facilities in the USSR. Several important telecommunications long lines are being laid underground with bunkered or underground repeater stations. Because this construction cannot be justified on the basis of cost or efficiency, it is believed to be an attempt to reduce vulnerability. Some bunkered radiobroadcast facilities also are known to exist, but it cannot be demonstrated how far such a program has been carried.

e. Rejection of Heavy Urban Public Shelters

Accumulating evidence demonstrates that Soviet defense planners have examined, and rejected as too costly, proposals to construct massive, deep level air raid shelters for the urban population. In the face of the threat from larger nuclear weapons, this rejection apparently led to controversy since 1958 as to the worth of any civil defense program and a search for feasible alternative protection. In early 1962, it was indicated that this controversy was settled with the advocates of continued civil defense efforts carrying the day. In the words of one official, "Some incompetent persons think that the only reliable means of defense against nuclear weapons are special, durable shelters, built deep underground, and that all other methods of defense are useless. Such a viewpoint is entirely erroneous...."

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Recent statements and publications specify the alternatives to massive deep level shelters as "covers" -- trenches, dugouts, farm cellars, basements, or even suitable areas in ordinary residential or industrial buildings and structures. Adaptation of garages, theaters, and pedestrian and transport tunnels for use as shelter has also been advocated. However, the continued use of specially constructed shelters of both the basement and detached types is still specified.

If warning time permits, the population of Soviet cities will be thinned out by strategic evacuation of "certain institutions," students, and nonworkers. Such evacuees will be resettled in small towns and the countryside, according to civil defense instructions. There, they would probably have to rely for fall-out protection on covered earth shelters constructed by their own or local labor.

#### 5. Alert Instructions

Recently published Soviet alert instructions for the public distinguish between a period when enemy attack threatens, the air raid signal, a chemical attack signal (which is used in case nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are employed), and the all-clear signal. Some of the instructions are substantially as follows:

In the period of threatening air attack, fire prevention and fire fighting preparations are accomplished, blackout is prepared, each citizen is "obliged to acquire" a gas mask and antichemical kit, food and water is protected from contamination, a two or three day supply of food and water is prepared to be carried when leaving the home, and partial urban evacuation may be announced and implemented. In rural areas, the dispersal of livestock is accomplished, preparations are made to receive and quarter urban evacuees, and medical installations "are established".

Upon the air raid signal: all persons turn off home utilities; draw the blackout shades; collect protective equipment, food, water, and documents; and go to the nearest shelter or cover. Those in public places or on the street must proceed as directed to the nearest shelter.

The chemical (or CBR) signal requires all to don gas masks and other protective equipment (boots, raincoats, etc.) if in the open or in unventilated shelter. In shelters equipped for chemical protection (i.e., filter ventilated) personnel remain in place and await special instructions.

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It is specifically noted for fall-out areas that all persons must seek shelter whether in formal shelter, basements, trenches, or in extreme cases the interior of residential buildings of other structures.

Persons are permitted to leave shelter when the air raid "all clear" is sounded. In case of chemical (i.e. CBR) contamination the "all clear" would be delayed until contamination was "eliminated".

Subsequently, a special "regimen" is established for the duration of the threat of enemy attack. Supervisors of enterprises, institutions, farms and training establishments are advised to take necessary measurements to ensure "normal activity."

#### 7. Conclusion:

The probable assumption of civil defense control by the Soviet military authorities should facilitate a more integrated passive defense within the the USSR.

Two aims appear paramount in Soviet civil defense instructions and preparations -- the preservation of manpower and the continued operation of the government and economy.

So far as can be observed, the Soviet civil defense system will rely for best performance on receiving several days warning.

Given such warning the Soviets apparently plan to thin out the population of large cities through evacuation, and to assign shelters to most if not all of the population in a mixture of formally constructed shelters (bunkers, subways and basement shelters), adaptable shelter space (tunnels, cellars, interiors of large buildings), and field-type earth shelters. The largest portion of such shelter would afford varying degrees of fall-out protection, but little protection from blast effects.

As to the continued functioning of government and economic installations; protected or alternate centers of government, hardened communications, intensified training, and an enlarged civil defense organization all appear to be factors in better preparing not only for rescue operations but for decontamination, repair, and recovery in a post-attack period.

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### Soviet Civil Defense

1. Since World War II the Soviets have maintained a continuing civil defense program. The ultimate goal of the USSR appears to be the incorporation of every able-bodied citizen into the civil defense system.

2. Publicity given civil defense in the USSR during the first six months of 1962 indicates that Soviet military leaders have acknowledged civil defense to be an important component of overall military posture, and that steps are being taken to increase publicity, to expand and accelerate training, and to effect organizational changes in the civil defense field.

### Soviet View of Civil Defense

3. Although the Soviet leaders have stated that they no longer consider war to be inevitable, they do not rule out the possibility of major warfare. If war should occur, they have said it would be characterized by the "use of air forces, many types of missiles, and various means of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical, and biological weapons." According to a Soviet civil defense manual, "The possession of atomic, chemical, and bacteriological weapons by the imperialists, and the threat of their use, forces us actively to prepare for civil defense."

4. Soviet strategists have emphasized the importance of the defense of rear areas for a number of years. In the Soviet view, heavy nuclear attacks would be concentrated on strategic areas and on administrative and economic centers during the first stage of any major war. A leading Soviet marshal recently repudiated the idea that a target system directed against military installations would significantly alter the threat to civilians stating, "... No matter at what targets nuclear weapons are aimed, they will invariably affect civilians as well... "

5. The USSR has expressed a lively interest in US civil defense, using it for propaganda purposes -- e.g. stating that American civil defense preparations are evidence of military aggressiveness. In their own case, however, Deputy Minister of Defense Chuykov called civil defense "one of the basic elements in the overall preparation of the country for defense."

6. The mission of civil defense was described in one Soviet publication as: (1) timely warning of the population; (2) organization of the maximum possible protection for civilians, factories and service installations of the national economy, and material objects of value from the "means of ordinary and mass destruction"; (3) rapid medical aid to casualties; and (4) "liquidation" of the effects of air attack in the shortest possible time.

### Organization

7. The organization of Soviet civil defense includes a staff structure formerly subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), but since early 1960 probably under the Ministry of Defense. Civil defense headquarters (or "staffs") exist at all government administrative levels from the national to the city.

8. The forces supposed to be available to the civil defense authorities may be classified into four main types: (1) "Services," consisting generally of employees of government departments; (2) units recruited from personnel of various factories and similar establishments; (3) "self-defense groups," composed of individuals in organizations such as schools or apartment houses; and (4) units of militarized personnel.

9. Services and factory units are to construct shelters, warn the population of the danger of an attack, and see that the necessary orders are observed if alarms are sounded. After an attack, the units are to rescue and evacuate victims; provide first aid; extinguish fires; repair damage to the electric, gas, telephone and other municipal systems; carry out decontamination in case of atomic, poison gas, or biological attack; and dispose of unexploded bombs. Other duties include the partial evacuation of the area and providing necessities to civilians who have lost their homes.

10. Self-defense groups are organized in nonindustrial enterprises, such as office buildings, educational establishments, apartment houses, and on collective farms. The groups are responsible to the heads of the respective establishments, apartment houses, and farms. Thus, the manager of an apartment house has control over the self-defense groups in the building, the groups being composed of residents and maintenance personnel.

11. Recently, it was disclosed that Soviet communities are no longer deemed capable of coping individually with civil defense emergencies. Civil defense has "ceased to be local"; the older system, called Local Anti-Air Defense (or MPVO), has been renamed "civil defense"; and it has become a "state wide system". According to the official making these disclosures, the scope of civil defense operations now will require "tens and sometimes even hundreds of thousands of persons, a great deal of equipment, transport facilities, and other means." He added that Soviet civil defense will require the active participation of every citizen and that civil defense is now an inseparable part of the defensive strength of the USSR. Thus the older scheme of civil defense, based on cities, is apparently being changed to one of larger area organization, but adding the tactics of urban evacuation and the use of mobile civil defense units.

12. Recently, it was stated that "non-militarized" civil defense units are in the process of formation in rural areas and that special instruction now must be organized for the preparation of dosimeter operators, radiomen, drivers, bulldozer operators, and the like.

Civil Defense Training

13. This special instruction will be an added responsibility of the DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy). This public, paramilitary organization has long been responsible for giving civil defense instruction to the Soviet public. Training of the Soviet population for civil defense has intensified since 1955. Although nominally voluntary, widespread public training indicates that the USSR has invoked a legal compulsion which holds able bodied adults over 16 years of age liable for civil defense services.

14. Formerly, civil defense in the USSR was prepared in semi-secrecy, avoiding publicity over radio and television, or in the large metropolitan newspapers. Instructions and publicity reached the Soviet public through lectures, specialized periodicals, and training courses. During the past year, however, civil defense radio and television broadcasts have been initiated in the USSR. This may reflect a policy change permitting the use of these media for civil defense publicity and instruction.

15. During the past two years, increased publicity has been given the effects of large nuclear weapons in the USSR. Prior to 1961, nuclear weapons were described generally to the Soviet public in terms of the nominal (20 kilotons TNT equivalent) atomic bomb. However, broadcasts and published articles since early 1961 have described some of the effects of 10 and 50 megaton weapons and have stressed increasingly the danger to be expected from widespread radioactive fall-out.

16. The DOSAAF maintains civil defense schools for instructors, and conducts popular training through its primary organizations which are organized in factories, institutions, schools, on farms, and in dwelling areas. Since 1955, DOSAAF has conducted three training courses for the general public totalling 46 hours of instruction. They are now engaged in a fourth course of 18 hours which stresses practical work and exercises. The fourth course includes two hours instruction in the purpose and function of the civil defense organization, evacuation, and methods of protecting the population; three hours in the use of air raid shelters and shelter equipment, rescue and repair work in disaster areas; two hours of fire fighting and rescue methods; four hours of methods of searching for casualties; four hours of detection of radiological, chemical, and bacteriological contamination, behavior in contaminated areas and decontamination methods; and three hours of practical and theoretical examinations.

17. The first course of civil defense training (after 1955) was said to have been completed by 85 percent of the Soviet population. No figure on achievement was published for the second course. Concerning the third course, it was announced that most DOSAAF units had completed the training task satisfactorily. The fourth course is still in progress. Publicity accompanying preparations for the Fifth All-Union Congress of DOSAAF (May 1962) called for the completion of the fourth course by the end of 1962.



In addition, Soviet schools routinely give the student civil defense instructions.

18. Until recently, civil defense drills -- city or area wide -- have not been publicized, nor reported by foreigners in the USSR. In July of this year, however, a group of Americans witnessed an air raid drill in Tashkent, USSR, which included blackout of the city, clearing streets, and patrolling by uniformed civil defense workers.

#### Shelter Program

19. The Soviets, although they ridicule the preparation of air raid shelters abroad, vigorously stress their value to the public at home -- for protection from the effects of atomic, chemical, and biological weapons. Soviet civil defense manuals depict a variety of shelters -- large heavy concrete bunkers, underground galleries or tunnels, basement shelters in masonry buildings, and what might be termed field-type shelters -- trenches, which are lined with wood (or other locally available material) and covered with two feet or more of earth. Publications in the USSR also point out the value of subways as shelter.

20. The Soviets have attempted to conceal the extent of their shelter construction program, denying it even exists when faced with a foreign audience. Their own civil defense pamphlets, however, speak of "special" shelters and state that, "In Soviet cities, the most widespread type of shelters are those located in the basements of masonry buildings." According to Soviet publications, fully prepared basement air raid shelters must be heat resistant, able to withstand the complete collapse of the building above, must be filter-ventilated and gas-tight, and supplied with first aid and emergency equipment. Soviet citizens are told they may have to remain in shelter for many days.

21. The character of postwar urban housing construction in the USSR -- largely masonry apartment houses -- has presented the USSR with the opportunity of providing fall-out shelter space during construction in the basements of new dwellings which accommodate about half the urban population. Basements which are not fully prepared as air raid shelters may be adapted for use in an emergency. The several masonry floors in new Soviet apartment dwellings could reduce fall-out radiation effects in basement areas by a factor of as much as 1,000.

22. Deep level subways are in operation in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. The Moscow subway alone could shelter as many as 2,000,000 persons in the lower levels.

23. Civil defense literature and instructions indicate that covered trench or field-type shelters will be ordered prepared in an emergency situation. These are stated to have the capability of attenuating fall-out radiation effects 100 to 300 fold.

24. Soviet civil defense literature has for some time recommended the use of ditches, walls or other defilade for emergency protection when a person is caught in the open without time to reach more formal type shelter.

25. It was publicly stated in February 1962 that "some comrades" in the USSR have had a skeptical attitude toward protecting the population. According to a leading civil defense figure, "They have incorrectly assumed that defensive measures consist only in building formal shelters.... It is clear such views cannot be accepted as being correct." He goes on to say that "protective structures" must be adapted for protection; structures such as garages, movie houses, transport and pedestrian tunnels. Somewhat earlier, a Soviet fallout civil defense manual contained the statement that ordinary "buildings and structures" could be used for defense against radioactive substances. Basements, internal corridors, and the middle stories of high buildings were said to provide adaptable shelter areas. Thus, it appears that the Soviets have developed interests similar to those of US civil defense planners in locating adaptable fallout shelter areas in existing structures.

#### Urban Evacuation

26. The civil defense system of the USSR has been designed in general with the assumption that some warning time will be available. Since 1958, emphasis has increased on plans for partial strategic urban evacuation. In a period of tension, the Soviets hope to be able to move school children, the aged, and other nonworkers to small towns and rural areas where they would be resettled. Such a procedure, however, would require several days, according to Soviet instructions.